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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK 
----------------------------------- X 
KEVIN DOWNS, 
Plaintiff, 
-v-
OATH INC., 
Defendant. 
----------------------------------- X 
JED S. RAKOFF, U.S.D.J. 
18-cv-10337 (JSR) 
MEMORANDUM ORDER 
Plaintiff Kevin Downs brings a one-count complaint against 
defendant Oath Inc. Now before the Court are the parties' cross-
motions for summary judgment. Downs moves for summary judgment 
on the issue of liability, and Oath moves for summary judgment 
on its defense of statutory immunity under the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act. For the reasons below, Downs's motion 
is denied, Oath's motion is granted, and the case is dismissed. 
Background 
Kevin Downs is a professional photographer who does 
freelance work for the New York Daily News. Defendant Oath 
Inc.'s Response to Plaintiff's Statement Pursuant to Local Rule 
56.1, at i 1 ("Oath 56.1 Counterstatement"), ECF No. 35. Oath 
Inc. is the owner and operator of HuffPost, which is a media 
brand with a website at www.huffingtonpost.com. Plaintiff's 
Opposition to Defendant's Statement Pursuant to Rule 56.1, at 
i 2 ("Downs 56.1 Counterstatement"), ECF No. 39. 
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On January 29, 2017, Downs photographed a group of 
individuals at JFK Airport who were protesting President Trump's 
"Travel Ban" (i.e., Executive Order 13769). Oath 56.1 
Counterstatement 1 20. On the same day, Downs licensed his 
photograph to the New York Daily News, which published it with 
an article titled "Federal judge grants emergency stay to thwart 
Trump's refugee ban and halt deportations." Id. 1 23. The next 
day, an article was posted to www.huffingtonpost.com with the 
title: "Trump's Disastrous Week of Presidency: The Chinese 
Exclusion Act and the Muslim Ban." Id. 1 24. The article - which 
contained commercial advertisements - used Downs's photograph 
without his permission. Id. 11 25, 26, 35. 
The article was not written by a HuffPost employee; 
instead, it was written and uploaded by Grace Ji-Sun Kim, who 
was a participant on HuffPost's "contributor" platform. Id. 
1 29. The contributor platform, which HuffPost operated between 
2005 and 2018, included over 100,000 contributors who self-
published blog posts. Downs 56.1 Counterstatement 11 3, 8. 
Contributors were neither employed nor paid by HuffPost, and 
they were able to publish articles directly on HuffPost without 
editorial review. Id. 11 4, 9. Contributors were required to 
agree to terms and conditions prohibiting them from uploading 
copyrighted material, id. 11 6-7, and after articles were 
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published, HuffPost editors would screen them for offensive or 
illegal content, Oath 56.1 Counterstatement ~ 7. HuffPost 
editors would also index articles, change articles' headlines, 
and copy edit articles' text. Id. 
The day after Kim posted her article, a HuffPost editor 
named Chloe Cohn screened the article for offensive or unlawful 
content. Downs 56.1 Counterstatement ~ 24. Cohn also added 
content tags to the article's metadata and a "related video" 
link beneath the article. Id. According to Victor Brand, who was 
Standards Editor for HuffPost at the time the article was 
published, the edit history of the article shows that the 
article included Downs's photograph at the time Kim uploaded it. 
Brand Deel. ~ 9, ECF No. 26. The edit history also shows that 
Cohn did not edit the text of Kim's article. Id. ~ 15. Attached 
to Brand's declaration are screenshots of the article's edit 
history that support his statements. See ECF No. 26, Ex. 3. 
Downs registered his copyright in his photograph on January 
2, 2018, Oath 56.1 Counterstatement ~ 45, and he filed the 
instant action on November 7, 2018, ECF No. 1. Downs brings a 
single claim for copyright infringement. ECF No. 11, at~~ 15-
19. Oath answered and raised a battery of affirmative defenses, 
including, as relevant here, statutory immunity under the 
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Digital Millennium Copyright Act ("DMCA"), absence of volitional 
conduct, fair use, and laches. ECF No. 15, at 11 2-18. 
Now before the Court are the parties' cross-motions for 
summary judgment. Downs moves for summary judgment on the issue 
of liability, and he also moves to dismiss Oath's affirmative 
defenses. ECF No. 27. Oath moves for summary judgment on its 
statutory immunity defense. ECF No. 22. Each party opposes the 
other's motion. ECF Nos. 34, 38. 
Standard of Review 
Under Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a 
"court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that 
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the 
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." "The movant 
bears the burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine 
dispute of fact, and, to award summary judgment, the court must 
be able to find after drawing all reasonable inferences in favor 
of a non-movant that no reasonable trier of fact could find in 
favor of that party." Palmer/Kane LLC v. Rosen Book Works LLC, 
204 F. Supp. 3d 565, 568 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) . 1 "[T]here is no issue 
for trial unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the 
1 Unless otherwise indicated, in quoting cases all internal 
quotation marks, alterations, emphases, footnotes, and citations 
are omitted. 
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nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party. 
If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly 
probative, summary judgment may be granted." Anderson v. Liberty 
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50 (1986). 
Analysis 
To establish copyright infringement, "two elements must be 
proven: (1) ownership of a valid copyright, and (2) copying of 
constituent elements of the work that are original." Feist 
Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 
(1991). The parties agree that Downs has satisfied both of these 
elements. However, the parties dispute whether Oath is 
nevertheless entitled to immunity under 17 U.S.C. § 512(c), 
which is one of the "safe harbor" provisions in the DMCA. 2 
Under§ 512(c), service providers may avoid liability for 
copyright infringement that occurs "by reason of the storage at 
the direction of a user of material that resides on a system or 
network controlled or operated by or for the service provider." 
17 U.S.C. § 512(c) (1). As relevant here, § 512(c) 's safe harbor 
applies only if a service provider: 
(A) (i) does not have actual knowledge that the 
material or an activity using the material on the 
system or network is infringing; 
2 Because the Court finds that Oath is entitled to statutory 
immunity, it does not address Oath's other affirmative defenses. 
5 
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Id. 
(ii) in the absence of such actual knowledge, is 
not aware of facts or circumstances from which 
infringing activity is apparent; or 
(iii) upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness, 
acts expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, 
the material; 
(B) does not receive a financial benefit directly 
attributable to the infringing activity, in a case in 
which the service provider has the right and ability to 
control such activity; and 
(C) upon notification of claimed infringement . . , 
responds expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, 
the material that is claimed to be infringing or to be 
the subject of infringing activity. 
Oath argues that it has satisfied each of the above 
requirements (as well as other requirements not at issue here) 
and that it is therefore entitled to immunity as a matter of 
law. See Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment Regarding Entitlement to DMCA Safe Harbor 6-17 
("Oath SJ Mem."), ECF No. 23; Defendant Oath Inc.'s Memorandum 
of Law in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment 
on Liability Against Defendant for Copyright Infringement under 
17 U.S.C. § 501, at 6-18 ("Oath SJ Opp."), ECF No. 34. Downs 
argues that Oath has failed to meet its burden - and, indeed, 
has failed to create a triable issue - as to three of the above 
requirements. See Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiff's 
Motion for Summary Judgment on Liability Against Defendant for 
6 
Case 1:18-cv-10337-JSR   Document 43   Filed 05/22/19   Page 6 of 22
Copyright Infringement under 17 U.S.C. § 501, at 8-12 ("Downs SJ 
Mem."), ECF No. 28; Memorandum of Law in Opposition to 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment Regarding DMCA Safe 
Harbor 5-10 ("Downs SJ Opp."), ECF No. 38. 3 
First, Downs argues, the infringement here did not occur 
"by reason of . storage at the direction of a user," 17 
U.S.C. § 501(c)(l), because Cohn, rather than Kim, was 
responsible for publication of the HuffPost article with Downs's 
photograph. See Reply Memorandum of Law in Support of 
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment on Liability Against 
Defendant for Copyright Infringement under 17 U.S.C. § 501, at 
4-6 ("Downs SJ Reply"), ECF No. 42. Second, Downs argues, Cohn 
was "aware of facts or circumstances from which infringing 
activity [wa]s apparent," 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) (1) (A) (ii) - i.e., 
Cohn had "red flag" knowledge of infringement - because the 
photograph in Kim's article had a New York Daily News photo 
3 Downs argued in his moving and opposition papers that Oath 
failed to designate or identify an agent to receive notices of 
infringement, as is required by 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) (2). See Downs 
SJ Mem. 9-10; Downs SJ Opp. 5-7. This argument, however, was 
predicated on a simple misunderstanding of HuffPost's ownership 
history. See Oath SJ Opp. 9 (explaining that Oath did not exist 
when Kim's article was posted and that AOL Inc. - HuffPost's 
owner and operator at the time - had a registered DMCA agent). 
Accordingly, Downs has since abandoned his argument that Oath 
failed to designate or identify an agent. See Transcript dated 
May 17, 2019, at 23:15-20. 
7 
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credit. See Downs SJ Opp. 9-10; Downs SJ Reply 6-7. And third, 
Downs argues, HuffPost "receive[d] a financial benefit directly 
attributable to the infringing activity, in a case in which [it] 
ha[d] the right and ability to control such activity," 17 U.S.C. 
§ 512 (c) (1) (B), because commercial advertisements appeared on 
the face of Kim's article. See Downs SJ Mem. 11-12; Downs SJ 
Opp. 10. 
For the reasons discussed herein, the Court concludes that 
each of Downs's arguments is unavailing and Downs has failed to 
create a genuine dispute as to any of the above requirements. 
Accordingly, Oath is entitled to immunity as a matter of law 
under the safe harbor in§ 512(c). 
I. By Reason of Storage at the Direction of a User 
"The§ 512(c) safe harbor is only available when the 
infringement occurs 'by reason of the storage at the direction 
of a user of material that resides on a system or network 
controlled or operated by or for the service provider.'" Viacom 
Int'l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19, 38 (2d Cir. 2012) 
(quoting 17 U.S.C. § 512 (c) (1)). This requirement that 
infringement occur "by reason of" user storage is not intended 
to place a strict "limitation on the ability of a service 
provider to modify user-submitted material." Id. at 39; see id. 
("[W]e conclude that§ 512(c) is clearly meant to cover more 
8 
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than mere electronic storage lockers."). Instead, while the safe 
harbor requires some causal connection between user storage and 
the alleged infringement, the Second Circuit has explained that 
"the§ 512(c) safe harbor extends to software functions 
performed [by the service provider] for the purpose of 
facilitating access to user-stored material." Id. 
Oath argues that the alleged infringement at issue here 
occurred by reason of user storage because Kim added Downs's 
photograph to her article. See Oath SJ Mem. 10-12; Oath SJ Opp. 
9-14. Moreover, Oath contends, the safe harbor applies even 
though HuffPost screened articles for offensive and illegal 
content, and even though Cohn added content tags and a related 
video link to Kim's article. See Oath SJ Opp. 10-12. Oath points 
to the Ninth Circuit's decision in Ventura Content, Ltd. v. 
Motherless, Inc., in which the court held that infringement 
occurred by reason of user storage even though the defendant 
website operator screened out illicit and apparently infringing 
material. 885 F.3d 597, 607-08 (9th Cir. 2018). Oath contrasts 
Ventura with Mavrix Photographs, LLC v. Livejournal, Inc., in 
which the court held that there was a triable issue as to 
whether infringement occurred by reason of user storage where 
the defendant website's moderators "review[ed] submissions and 
publicly post[ed] only about one-third of submissions." 873 F.3d 
9 
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1045, 1056 (9th Cir. 2017). Because Kim's article was posted 
directly to HuffPost and Cohn conducted only cursory screening 
and modification, Oath argues, the instant case is closer to 
Ventura than it is to Mavrix. See Oath SJ Opp. 11. 
Downs responds that the alleged infringement did not occur 
by reason of user storage. See Downs SJ Reply 4-6. First, Downs 
argues, there is no evidence that Kim, rather than Cohn, added 
the photograph to the article. Id. at 4. In fact, Downs 
suggests, it is "likely that [Cohn] added the Photograph" to 
Kim's article because Cohn also added content tags and a related 
video link. Id. (emphasis added). Second, Downs argues, even if 
Kim added the photograph, Cohn "ultimately optimized and 
substantively enhanced the Article. [and] made the Article 
ready for mass publication to audiences worldwide." Id. at 4-5. 
Downs contends that Cohn "made editorial decisions as to what 
articles were indexed and which were not," and that Kim's 
article was therefore "subject to a selection process by virtue 
of Cohn's optimization for Google search indexing." Id. at 5. 
Beginning with the issue of who added the photograph to the 
article, the undisputed evidence demonstrates that it was Kim, 
not Cohn. As noted above, Oath has put forth screenshots of the 
article's edit history, see ECF No. 26, Ex. 3, as well as a 
sworn declaration from Victor Brand, who was Standards Editor 
10 
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for HuffPost at the time the article was published, Brand Deel. 
~ 9. Downs, in opposition, has offered nothing more than 
speculation that Cohn may have added the photograph because she 
added a video link as well. See Downs SJ Reply 4. This is 
insufficient to create a genuine dispute as to whether Kim added 
the photograph (not to mention grossly inadequate to support 
Downs's claim that Cohn "likely" added the photograph). 
Moreover, while Downs complains that Oath failed to submit 
supportive affidavits from Cohn and "Chin" - by whom Downs 
presumably means Kim - Downs could have deposed these 
individuals himself, and he chose not to. See id. at 4 n.2. 
Moving to the question of whether Cohn's cursory screening 
and modification place Kim's article outside of the safe 
harbor's protections, the case law supports Oath's position over 
Downs's. As the Tenth Circuit explained in BWP Media USA, Inc. 
v. Clarity Digital Group, LLC, "if the infringing content has 
merely gone through a screening or automated process, the 
[service provider] will generally benefit from the safe harbor's 
protection." 820 F.3d 1175, 1181 (10th Cir. 2016); see Ventura, 
885 F.3d at 607-08 (discussed above); cf. Costar Grp., Inc. v. 
LoopNet, Inc., 373 F.3d 544, 556 (4th Cir. 2004) (service 
provider not liable for infringement where employees conducted 
"cursory" reviews of user-uploaded photographs for copyrighted 
11 
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and irrelevant material). Mavrix - the only case on which Downs 
relies - is distinguishable, as the defendant there chose a 
small subset of user submissions to post publicly. 873 F.3d at 
1056. Here, contributors like Kim published their articles 
directly to HuffPost. 
Moreover, the addition of content tags does not deprive 
Oath of immunity under§ 512(c). As the Second Circuit explained 
in Viacom, "the§ 512(c) safe harbor extends to software 
functions performed for the purpose of facilitating access to 
user-stored material." 676 F.3d at 39. This is the precise 
purpose of content tags. Indeed, Viacom approvingly cited to Io 
Group, Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc., in which the court held that 
infringing content was stored at the direction of the user even 
though the defendant website's employees sometimes added content 
tags after users uploaded videos. 586 F. Supp. 2d 1132, 1140, 
1146-48 (N.D. Cal. 2008). Similarly, in UMG Recordings, Inc. v. 
Shelter Capital Partners LLC, the Ninth Circuit held that 
"§ 512(c) encompasses the access-facilitating processes that 
automatically occur when a user uploads a video to [defendant's 
website]," 718 F.3d 1006, 1016 (9th Cir. 2013), even though 
these access-facilitating processes included the assignment of 
content tags, see UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Veoh Networks Inc., 
665 F. Supp. 2d 1099, 1109 (C.D. Cal. 2009). 
12 
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Based on these cases - and the other considerations 
discussed above - the Court concludes that Downs has not created 
a triable issue as to whether the alleged infringement occurred 
by reason of user storage. The undisputed evidence demonstrates 
that Kim added the photograph to the article. And Cohn's cursory 
screening and modification of Kim's article do not place the 
article outside of the protections of§ 512(c). 
II. Red Flag Knowledge 
"[I]n order to be disqualified from the benefits of the 
safe harbor by reason of red flag knowledge under 
§ 512 (c) (1) (A) (ii), the service provider must have actually 
known facts that would make the specific infringement claimed 
objectively obvious to a reasonable person." Capitol Records, 
LLC v. Vimeo, LLC, 826 F.3d 78, 93 (2d Cir. 2016). "The 
hypothetical reasonable person to whom infringement must be 
obvious is an ordinary person - not endowed with specialized 
knowledge or expertise concerning . the laws of copyright." 
Id. at 93-94. Moreover, while statutory immunity is an 
affirmative defense, "the burden falls on the copyright owner to 
demonstrate that the service provider acquired knowledge of the 
infringement, or of facts and circumstances from which 
infringing activity was obvious, and failed to promptly take 
down the infringing matter, thus forfeiting its-right to the 
13 
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safe harbor." Id. at 95; see id. ("The plaintiff is, of course, 
entitled to take discovery of the service provider to enable it 
to make this showing."). 
Downs argues that Cohn had red flag knowledge of 
infringement because the photograph in Kim's article had a New 
York Daily News credit. See Downs SJ Opp. 9-10; Downs SJ Reply 
6-7. "It is simply not plausible," Downs contends, "that a 
HuffPost professional would think that an unpaid contributor 
such as Kim had authority from the Daily News (or a professional 
photojournalist) to post a photograph that was published just 
one day before by HuffPost's competitor in the news industry." 
Downs SJ Reply 7; see id. at 6 ("Any trained professional in 
Cohn's position should have known that the photograph was 
infringing based on the attribution to New York Daily News." 
(capitalization omitted)). 
As Oath explains, however, immunity under the DMCA's safe 
harbor does not depend on whether a "HuffPost professional" or a 
"trained professional in Cohn's position" would or should have 
known that the photograph in Kim's article was infringing. 
Instead, immunity depends on whether the infringement would have 
been "obvious to a reasonable person . not endowed with 
specialized knowledge or expertise concerning . . the laws of 
14 
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copyright." Capitol Records, 826 F.3d at 93-94. Here, the Court 
concludes that infringement would not have been so obvious. 
The Court's analysis on this issue is guided by the Second 
Circuit's decision in Capitol Records, which is closely on 
point. There, defendant Vimeo operated a website to which users 
uploaded videos. Id. at 81. Vimeo's employees would "identify 
some videos with a 'like' sign, occasionally prepare commentary 
on a video, offer technical assistance to users, participate in 
forum discussions, and at times inspect videos suspected of 
violating Vimeo's policies." Id. at 84. Unhappy with the 
unauthorized use of sound recordings in user-uploaded videos, 
record and music publishing companies sued Vimeo for 
infringement. Id. at 81. Plaintiffs argued that Vimeo had red 
flag knowledge of infringement in cases where an employee viewed 
a "video containing all or virtually all of a recognizable, 
copyrighted song." Id. at 93. 
The Second Circuit rejected plaintiffs' argument for 
several reasons. As relevant here, the court explained that an 
"employee's viewing might have been brief," such that the 
employee did not ascertain that the video contained a 
copyrighted audio recording. Id. at 96. Furthermore, the court 
continued, the employee might not have been aware that the video 
contained a copyrighted audio recording because the employee 
15 
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might have been viewing the video for "many different business 
purposes," such as "classification by subject matter" or 
"sampling to detect inappropriate obscenity or bigotry." Id. And 
even assuming that the employee was aware of the copyrighted 
recording, the court concluded that the employee could not be 
expected to distinguish between infringements, on the one hand, 
and fair or authorized uses, on the other. See id. at 97. 
Applying this reasoning to the instant case, the Court 
holds that HuffPost did not have red flag knowledge of the 
alleged infringement in Kim's article. As in Capitol Records, 
Cohn's viewing of Downs's photograph may have been brief. And as 
in Capitol Records, Cohn was viewing Kim's article for multiple 
purposes, including subject matter classification and screening 
for offensive content. It is of course possible that Cohn saw 
the New York Daily News photo credit, but Capitol Records makes 
clear that this possibility is not enough to create a triable 
issue as to red flag knowledge. Instead, "the burden £[ell] on 
[Downs] to demonstrate that [Cohn] acquired knowledge of . 
facts and circumstances from which infringing activity was 
16 
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obvious," id. at 95, and Downs failed to take discovery or 
otherwise adduce evidence sufficient to make this showing. 4 
Moreover, even if Downs showed that Cohn was aware of the 
New York Daily News photo credit, Capitol Records suggests that 
Oath still would be entitled to summary judgment on the issue of 
red flag knowledge. Although the fair use and licensing issues 
raised by the inclusion of a sound recording in a video are not 
identical to those raised by the inclusion of a photograph in a 
blog post, the Court does not see how Cohn, any more than the 
employees in Capitol Records, could be expected to distinguish 
between infringements and fair or authorized uses. Accordingly, 
the Court holds that Downs has failed to create a triable issue 
as to red flag knowledge. 
III. Financial Benefit and the Right and Ability to Control 
"Apart from the foregoing knowledge provisions, the 
§ 512(c) safe harbor provides that an eligible service provider 
must 'not receive a financial benefit directly attributable to 
the infringing activity, in a case in which the service provider 
has the right and ability to control such activity.'" Viacom, 
4 At argument, the only explanation Downs gave for failing to 
depose Cohn was that "the burden is on [Oath] to establish [its] 
defense." See Transcript dated May 17, 2019, at 5:8-9. Although 
this may be true as a general matter with respect to Oath's 
statutory immunity defense, Capitol Records makes clear that 
Downs has the burden of proving red flag knowledge. 
17 
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676 F.3d at 36 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 512 (c) (1) (B)). Downs argues 
that Oath fails to satisfy this requirement because HuffPost 
received a financial benefit from the commercial advertisements 
that were visible on the face of Kim's article. See Downs SJ 
Mem. 12; Downs SJ Opp. 10. Furthermore, Downs contends, Oath had 
the right and ability to control Kim's article because HuffPost 
"engag[ed] in human supervision and review [of] content posted 
to the Website." Downs SJ Mem. 13; Downs SJ Reply 8. 
Both of these arguments fail. Beginning with the question 
of whether HuffPost "receive[d] a financial benefit directly 
attributable to the infringing activity," it is not enough for 
Downs to show that HuffPost ran commercial advertisements on its 
website. If that were sufficient, then practically every 
revenue-generating website would satisfy the financial benefit 
prong of 17 U.S.C. § 512 (c) (1) (B). 
Instead, Downs must put forth evidence of a connection 
between the allegedly infringing activity and the financial 
benefit that HuffPost received. In Columbia Pictures Industries, 
Inc. v. Fung, for example, the Ninth Circuit held that 
advertising revenue met the financial benefit prong where the 
defendant "promoted advertising by pointing to infringing 
activity; obtained advertising revenue that depended on the 
number of visitors to his sites; attracted primarily visitors 
18 
Case 1:18-cv-10337-JSR   Document 43   Filed 05/22/19   Page 18 of 22
who were seeking to engage in infringing activity . ; and 
encouraged that infringing activity." 710 F.3d 1020, 1045 (9th 
Cir. 2013). In Ventura, by contrast, the court held that the 
financial benefit prong was not met where the defendant "did not 
advertise itself as a place to get pirated materials." 885 F.3d 
at 613. Although the court recognized that the more content 
hosted on defendant's website, "the more users it would attract, 
and more views would lead to more advertising revenue," the 
court explained that "[t]he words 'the' and 'directly' in 
[§ 512 (c) (1) (B)] . must mean that some revenue has to be 
distinctly attributable to the infringing material." Id. 
Here, Downs has made no showing that the advertising 
revenue HuffPost received was "distinctly attributable" to 
infringing activity. There is no evidence that HuffPost 
encouraged infringement, or that it promoted advertising by 
pointing to infringement, or even that its users primarily 
engaged in infringing conduct. To the contrary, the undisputed 
evidence shows that HuffPost simply ran advertisements on user-
generated articles, some of which inevitably contained 
infringing material. This case is thus much closer to Ventura 
than it is to Fung. Indeed, the financial benefit analysis 
likely favors Oath even more than it did the defendant in 
Ventura, as the defendant in Ventura operated a website that 
19 
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hosted nearly 13 million pornographic photographs and videos 
that were uploaded by users. Id. at 600. The Court suspects that 
infringing content was a more significant driver of advertising 
revenue on the Ventura defendant's website than it was on 
HuffPost's contributor platform. 
Even if the Court were to assume, arguendo, that HuffPost 
"receive[d] a financial benefit directly attributable to the 
infringing activity," Downs has nevertheless failed to show that 
HuffPost had the "right and ability to control such activity." 
As the Second Circuit has explained, the "right and ability to 
control" must "require[] something more than the ability to 
remove or block access to materials posted on a service 
provider's website." Viacom, 676 F.3d at 38. Otherwise, the 
ability to remove or block access, which is a "prerequisite to 
safe harbor protection under § 512 (c) (1) (A) (iii) & (C) would at 
the same time be a disqualifier under § 512 (c) (1) (B)." Id. at 
37. Instead, possession of the "right and ability to control" 
contemplates circumstances in which "a service provider exert[s] 
substantial influence on the activities of users." Id. at 38; 
see Ventura, 885 F.3d at 613 ("To have the right and ability to 
control, a service provider must be able to exert 'substantial 
influence' on its users' activities."). 
20 
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Based on the evidence before the Court, Downs has failed to 
create a genuine dispute as to whether HuffPost exerted 
substantial influence over contributors' activities. Instead, 
the undisputed evidence shows that contributors self-published 
their articles directly to the website and that HuffPost engaged 
in cursory screening and modification. This level of involvement 
is insufficient as a matter of law to establish that HuffPost 
had the "right and ability to control" infringing activity by 
members of its contributor platform. Accordingly - and for the 
reasons discussed above - the Court holds that Oath is not 
disqualified from the DMCA's safe harbor by reason of failure to 
satisfy the requirements of § 512 (c) (1) (B) 
Conclusion 
In sum, the undisputed evidence shows that: (1) the 
allegedly infringing use of Downs's photograph occurred "by 
reason of . storage at the direction of a user," 17 U.S.C. 
§ 512 (c) (1); (2) HuffPost was "not aware of facts or 
circumstances from which infringing activity [wa]s apparent," 
id. § 512 (c) (1) (A) (ii); and (3) Huff Post did "not receive a 
financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing 
activity, in a case in which [it] ha[d] the right and ability to 
control such activity," id. § 512 (c) (1) (B). Downs' s motion for 
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summary judgment is therefore denied, Oath's motion for summary 
judgment is granted, and the case is hereby dismissed. 
The Clerk is directed to close the entries at docket 
numbers 22 and 27, and to enter judgment dismissing the case 
with prejudice. 
SO ORDERED. 
Dated: New York, NY 
May J~, 2019 
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